Why Aceh is a Poor Candidate for a Safe Haven

Earlier today, I wrote about the reports in Jakarta’s English language press that the National Police are pursuing a group they claim is connected to Noordin Mohammed Top. I said I was skeptical that the group is, in fact, connected based on the evidence available. I am skeptical for another reason, as well: Aceh makes a poor candidate for a safe haven, either for Jemaah Islamiyah or Noordin’s network. Yes, there are lush forests in which to hide such an operation. That’s true of most of Indonesia. But is there sufficient local support for it? For three reasons, we should be skeptical.

First, despite Western media indications to the contrary, most Acehnese are not supportive of the more austere measures taken by their government since the imposition of syariah law after a peace agreement was signed in Helsinki in 2005. Islamist parties suffered major losses in regional and national elections last year, and Peter Gelling’s interviews on the ground with locals last year bear this out.

Second, though the imposition of syariah law certainly gave succor to any Salafists in Aceh, there is no evidence to suggest that these Salafists are the violent variety, or even further, that they support Noordin’s particular brand of mass-casualty attacks against the “far enemy” of Westerners in Indonesia. Most violent Salafists in Southeast Asia are much more interested in inciting sectarian violence in mixed communities than bombing hotels.

Third, while it is certainly possible for one violent Salafist to radicalize a community where there is little popular support for such actions, as we saw with the radicalization of the Palembang Group in 2008, a training camp housing 50 militants is a much more conspicuous operation. Militants associated with Jemaah Islamiyah and Noordin’s separate network rely on family members and former comrades for shelter and succor. Aceh is short on both categories of accomplices, so it is hard to understand why they would choose to set up shop there.